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1 Introduction
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Constitutions came earlier than democracy (Strong 1963). During the late Middle
Ages and early modern times, constitutions were mainly devices for establishing
rights and limiting powers, functions that are still emphasized in certain academic
literature on constitutions (see, for example, North and Weingast 1989; North 1990;
Buchanan 1990; Weingast 1995). But as the old powers to be limited were auto-
cratic, constitutionalism advanced almost naturally, together with the expansion of
suVrage rights and democratization.
A constitution is usually deWned as ‘‘a set of rules’’ for making collective
decisions (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Elster and Slagstad 1988;
Mueller 1996). Enforceable decisions made by means of rules can solve human
coordination and cooperation dilemmas (as discussed by Brennan and Buchanan
1985; Hardin 1989; Ordeshook 1992). However, diVerent rules may favor diVerent
decisions with diVerently distributed beneWts. Two sets of rules can be distin-
guished: (a) those ‘‘to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties
among the various agencies and oYces of government’’, and (b) those to ‘‘deWne
the relationships between these and the public’’, which in democracy are based on
elections (Finer 1988).
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2 Origins and Evolution
of Constitutional Models
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
2.1 Division of Powers
The Wrst set of constitutional rules just mentioned regulates the division of powers
among diVerent institutions. Virtually all the political regimes in world history
have been based on a dual formula: a one-person oYce combined with multiple-
person oYces (as remarked by Congleton 2001). The rationale for this dualism is
that, while a one-person institution may be highly eVective at decision making and
implementation, a multiple-person institution may be more representative of the
diVerent interests and values in the society. In modern times, a few basic consti-
tutional models can be compared in the light of this dualism. They include: the old,
transitional model of constitutional monarchy; the modern democratic models of
parliamentary regime and checks-and-balances regime; and two variants of the
latter usually called presidentialism and semi-presidentialism.
The model of constitutional monarchy reunites a one-person non-elected mon-
arch with executive powers and a multiple-person elected assembly with legislative
powers. This mixed formula was formally shaped by the French constitution of
1791, which, although was ephemeral in its implementation, became a reference for
many constitutions in other countries during the nineteenth century, including
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; in more
recent times, similar formulas have been adopted in some Arab monarchies,
such as Jordan and Morocco. With broadening suVrage and democratization, the
non-elected monarch’s powers were reduced, while those of the elected assembly
expanded, especially regarding the control of executive ministers, thus moving
towards formulas closer to the parliamentary regime.
The parliamentary regime is one of the two democratic formulas that can result
from the process of enhancing the role of the electing assembly and limiting the
monarch’s executive powers. According to the English or ‘Westminster’ model
developed since the late seventeenth century, the parliament became the sovereign
institution, also assuming the power of appointing and dismissing ministers, while
the monarch remained a ceremonial although non-accountable Wgure. Not until
the creation of the Third French Republic in 1871 did a parliamentary republic exist.
Nowadays, there are parliamentary regimes in approximately half of the demo-
cratic countries in the world, including, with the British-style monarchical variant,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, and Sweden, and with the republican variant, Austria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, and Switzerland.
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In this framework, the development of political parties was usually interpreted as
a force eroding the central role of the parliament. In old constitutional studies, the
British model was provocatively labeled rather than ‘parliamentary’, a ‘Cabinet’
regime (see, for instance, Loewenstein 1957; Jennings 1959; Crossman 1963; Wheare
1963). However, it has more recently been remarked that the growth of party was
instrumental in reducing the inXuence of the monarch but not necessarily that of
the parliament. With the reduction of the monarch to a Wgurehead, the prime
minister has indeed become the new one-person relevant Wgure, but the position of
the Cabinet has weakened. In contrast, the role of parliament has survived, and
even, in a modest way, thrived. Despite long-standing concerns regarding the
balance of power, ‘‘parliament has always remained the primary institution of the
British polity’’ (Flinders 2002; see also Bogdanor 2003; Seaward and Silk 2003).
In the other democratic formula, which originated with the 1787 constitution of
the United States, it is not only the multiple-person legislative assembly that is
popularly elected but also the one-person chief executive. The non-elected mon-
arch was replaced with an elected president with executive powers. This model of
political regime implies, thus, separate elections and divided powers between the
chief executive and the legislative branch. It was widely imitated in Latin American
republics, but with the introduction of strong biases in favor of the presidency, as
will be discussed in a moment; other variants have also been adopted in a number
of Asian countries under American inXuence, including Indonesia, South Korea,
the Philippines, and Taiwan.
In the original US version, this model is a complex system of ‘‘checks and
balances’’ or mutual controls between separately elected or appointed institutions
(presidency, house, senate, court). They include term limits for the president,
limited presidential veto of congressional legislation, senate rules permitting a
qualiWed minority to block decisions, senatorial ratiWcation of presidential
appointments, congressional appointment of oYcers and control of administrative
agencies, congressional impeachment of the president, and judicial revision of
legislation.
Recent analyses have formally shown how these counter-weighting mechanisms
play in favor of power sharing between institutions and as equivalent devices to
super-majority rules for decision making. The obstacles introduced by the numer-
ous institutional checks may stabilize socially ineYcient status quo policies, but
they also guarantee that most important decisions are made by broad majorities
able to prevent the imposition of a small, or minority, group’s will. With similar
analytical insight but a diVerent evaluation, other analyses have remarked that
separate elections and divided governments create a ‘‘dual legitimacy’’ prone to
‘‘deadlock,’’ that is, legislative paralysis and inter-institutional conXict (Hammond
and Miller 1987; Riggs 1988; Neustadt 1990; Linz 1990a; Cox and Kernell 1991; Riker
1992; Krehbiel 1996, 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; Cameron 2000; Dahl 2002;
Colomer 2005b).
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Another two variants of political regime with separate elections for the presi-
dency and the assembly have developed. The Wrst, usually called ‘‘presidential-
ism,’’ have eventually emerged in almost all twenty republics in Latin American
since mid or late nineteenth century, including in particular Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As men-
tioned, some founding constitution makers in these countries claimed to be
imitating the United States constitution, but, in contrast to the preventions
against one-person’s expedient decisions introduced in the USA, some of them
looked farther back to the absolutist monarchies preceding any division of
powers and mixed regimes and aimed at having ‘‘elected kings with the name
of presidents’’ (in Simo´n Bolı´var’s words). The distinction between US-style
checks-and-balances, uniWed government in presidential regimes, and ‘‘presiden-
tialism,’’ which can be referred to Madison, JeVerson, and Hamilton, respectively
(according to Burns 1965), was already remarked in old constitutional studies for
Latin America. (Garcı´a Caldero´n 1914; Fitzgibbon 1945; Loewenstein 1949; Stokes
1959; Lambert 1963).
Presidential dominance has been attempted through the president’s veto power
over legislation and his control of the army, which also exist in the USA, supple-
mented with long presidential terms and reelections, unconstrained powers to
appoint and remove members of the cabinet and other highly-placed oYcers,
legislative initiative, the capacity to dictate legislative decrees, Wscal and adminis-
trative authority, discretionary emergency powers, suspension of constitutional
guarantees and, in formally federal countries, the right to intervene in state aVairs.
The other side of this same coin is weak congresses, which are not usually given
control over the cabinet and are frequently constrained by short session periods
and a lack of resources (Linz 1990a; Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela
1994; Aguilar 2000; Cox and Morgenstern 2002; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002).
Proposals of reform have included moves towards all the other regime types,
including semi-parliamentarism (Nino 1992), Westminster features (Mainwairing
and Shugart 1997), US-style checks-and-balances (Ackerman 2000), and multi-
party parliamentarism (Colomer and Negretto 2005).
The second variant, usually called a ‘‘semi-presidential’’ regime, but also ‘‘semi-
parliamentary,’’ ‘‘premier-presidential’’ or ‘‘dual-executive,’’ had been experimen-
ted with in Finland and Germany after World War I but was more consistently
shaped with the 1958 constitution of France. Similar constitutional formulas have
been recently adopted in a few countries in Eastern Europe, including Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Russia, as well as a number of others in Africa. With this
formula, the presidency and the assembly are elected separately, as in a checks-and-
balances regime, but it is the assembly that appoints and can dismiss a prime
minister, as in a parliamentary regime. The president and the prime minister share
the executive powers in a ‘‘governmental diarchy’’ (Duverger 1970, 1978, 1980;
Duhamel and Parodi 1988).
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At the beginning of the French experience it was speculated that this constitu-
tional model would produce an alternation between presidential and parliamentary
phases, respectively favoring the president and the prime minister as a one-person
dominant Wgure. The Wrst phase of the alternation was indeed conWrmed with
presidents enjoying a compact party majority in the assembly. In these situations,
‘‘the president can become more powerful than in the classical presidential regimes,’’
as well as more powerful than the British-style prime minister because he accumu-
lates the latter’s powers plus those of the monarch (Duverger 1998). The second,
parliamentary phase was, in contrast, not conWrmed, since, even if the president
faces a prime minister, a cabinet, and an assembly majority with a diVerent political
orientation, he usually retains signiWcant powers, including the dissolution of the
assembly, as well as partial vetoes over legislation and executive appointments,
among others, depending on the speciWc rules in each country. This makes the
president certainly more powerful than any monarch or republican president in a
parliamentary regime. (A gradual acknowledgment that a signiWcant division of
powers exists in the ‘‘cohabitation’’ phase can be followed in more recent works in
French by Duverger 1986, 1996, 1998). There can, thus, indeed be two ‘‘phases,’’
depending on whether the president’s party has a majority in the assembly and can
appoint the prime minister or not; however, the two phases are not properly
presidential and parliamentary, but they rather produce an even higher concentra-
tion of power than in a presidential regime and a dual executive, respectively. (See
also discussion in Bahro, Bayerlein, and Veser 1998; Sartori 1994; Elgie 1999).
2.2 Electoral Rules
The second set of constitutional rules mentioned above regulates the relationships
between citizens and public oYcers by means of elections. A long tradition of
empirical studies, usually focusing on democratic regimes during the second half of
the twentieth century, has assumed that elections and electoral systems could be
taken as an independent variable from which the formation of political parties and
other features of a political system derive (Duverger 1951; Rae 1967; Grofman and
Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Katz 1997). But
an alternative point of view emphasizes that it is the governments and parties that
choose constitutional rules, including electoral systems, and, thus, the role of the
dependent and the independent variables in the previous analytical framework
could be upside down (Grumm 1958; Lipson 1964; Sa¨rlvick 1982; Boix 1999;
Colomer 2004, 2005a).
Most modern electoral rules originated as alternatives to a traditional electoral
system composed of multi-member districts, open ballots permitting individual
candidate voting, and plurality or majority rule. This understudied type of
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electoral system was used very widely in local and national assemblies in pre-
democratic or early democratic periods before and during the nineteenth century;
it is still probably the most common procedure in small community, condomin-
ium, school, university, professional organizations, corporation boards, and union
assemblies and elections; and it has also been adopted in a small number of new
democracies in recent times. It appears indeed as almost ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘spontan-
eous’’ to many communities when they have to choose a procedure of
collective decision making based on votes, especially because it permits a varied
representation of the community.
But while this set of rules can produce fair representation, at the same time it
creates strong incentives for the formation of ‘‘factional’’ candidacies or voting
coalitions, which are the most primitive form of political parties. In elections in
multi-member districts by plurality rule, factions or parties tend to induce ‘‘voting
in bloc’’ for a closed list of candidates, which may provoke a single-party sweep.
Once partisan candidacies, partisan voting in bloc, and partisan ballots emerged
within the framework of traditional assemblies and elections, political leaders,
activists and politically motivated scholars began to search for alternative electoral
systems able to reduce single-party sweeps and exclusionary victories (Duverger
1951; see also LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; and the survey by Scarrow 2002).
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, new electoral procedures
were invented and adopted as innovative variations of the traditional system
mentioned above. They can be classiWed into three groups, depending on
whether they changed the district magnitude, the ballot, or the rule. The Wrst
group implied a change of the district magnitude from multi-member to single-
member districts, of course keeping both individual candidate voting and major-
itarian rules. With smaller single-member districts, a candidate that would have
been defeated by a party sweep in a multi-member district may be elected. This
system, thus, tends to produce more varied representation than multi-member
districts with party closed lists, although less than the old system of multi-
member districts with an open, individual candidate ballot. The second group
of electoral rules introduced new forms of ballot favoring individual candidate
voting despite the existence of party candidacies, such as limited and cumulative
voting, while maintaining the other two essential elements of the traditional
system: multi-member districts and majoritarian rules. Finally, the third group of
new electoral rules implied the introduction of proportional representation
formulas, which are compatible with multi-member districts and also, in some
variants, with individual candidate voting, and permit the development of multi-
partism (Colomer 2006).
DiVerent electoral rules and procedures create diVerent incentives to coordinate
the appropriate number of candidacies (as has been emphasized by Cox 1997).
However, coordination may fail, especially under restrictive formulas based
on plurality rule that may require paramount eVorts to concentrate
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numerous potential candidates into a few broad, potentially winning candidacies.
By analyzing party systems and elections over long periods and, in some studies,
within each country, it has been shown that electoral systems based on plurality or
majority rules tend to remain in place only to the extent that two large parties are
able to attract broad electoral support and alternate in government. But when
multiple parties develop in spite and against the incentives provided by the existing
majoritarian system and through coordination failures, they tend to adopt more
permissive electoral rules, especially proportional representation formulas.
Generally, the choice of electoral systems follows what can be called ‘‘Micro-
mega’s rule,’’ by which the large prefer the small and the small prefer the large: a few
large parties tend to prefer small assemblies, small district magnitudes, and rules
based on small quotas of votes for allocating seats, such as plurality rule, while
multiple small parties tend to prefer large assemblies, large district magnitudes,
and large quotas such as those of proportional representation. Nowadays, more
than 80 percent of democratic regimes in countries with more than one million
inhabitants use electoral systems with proportional representation rules (Lijphart
1994; Blais and Massicotte 1997; Colomer 2004, 2005a).
The relevant implication of this discussion for constitutional analysis is that
electoral systems are intertwined with party systems, which in turn shape the
relations between the legislative and the executive. All these elements deWne
diVerent types of political regime.
3 Constitutional Regime Typologies
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Traditional legalistic classiWcations of constitutional regimes focused, in addition
to the distinction between autocracy and democracy, on the diVerence, within the
latter, between ‘‘parliamentary’’ and ‘‘presidential’’ regimes (see, for example,
Duverger 1955; Verney 1959; and the compilation by Lijphart 1992). The introduc-
tion of a second dimension, the electoral system, discussed in the previous section,
makes the classiWcation of democratic regimes more complex. In particular, within
parliamentary regimes one can distinguish between those using majoritarian
electoral rules, which typically imply that a single party is able to win an assembly
majority and appoint the prime minister, and those using proportional represen-
tation, which correspond to multi-party systems and coalition cabinets. Presiden-
tial regimes and their variants, in contrast, are less aVected by the electoral system
dimension since at least one of the systems, the one for the election of the
president, must be majoritarian and produce a single absolute winner.
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What has possibly been the most inXuential political regime typology in recent
comparative studies is based on the two institutional dimensions mentioned and
the corresponding degrees of concentration of constitutional and party powers
(Lijphart 1984, 1999). Lijphart primarily analyzes the ‘‘executives–parties’’ dimen-
sion, that is, the relation between cabinets and parliaments and the set of party and
electoral systems, as well as a number of other highly-correlated variables (while
another dimension not to be discussed here regards the degree of territorial
centralization). By statistical correlations and factor analysis of the empirical data
reunited, he arrives at a dual political regime typology, organized around
the ‘‘majoritarian’’ (or Westminster) and the ‘‘consensus’’ models of democracy,
respectively characterized by high power-concentration and broad power sharing.
This simple empirical dichotomy, however, seems to be a contingent result of the
sample of countries considered, since very few have checks-and-balances, presi-
dential, or semi-presidential regimes (1 percent in the Wrst exercise with 21 coun-
tries, 17 percent in the second with 36). Therefore, according to this widely used
typology, such a diversity of political regimes as the parliamentary-majoritarian of
the United Kingdom, the checks-and-balances of the United States, and semi-
presidential of France, among others, are included in the ‘‘majoritarian’’ type, while
the consensus type refers to parliamentary-proportional regimes, mostly located in
continental Europe. (For methodological critiques and alternative operational
proposals, see Bogaards 2000; Taagepera 2003.)
Other approaches to the way diVerent constitutional regimes work do not focus
on a priori analysis of institutions but give primacy to the role of political parties.
Some authors have promoted broad uses of the categories of ‘‘uniWed’’ and
‘‘divided’’ government. This new dual typology was initially applied to the analysis
of the United States, where a ‘uniWed government’ with the president’s party having
a majority in both houses of the Congress has existed for only 59 percent of the
time from 1832 to 2006, while ‘‘divided government,’’ which was very frequent
during the second half of the twentieth century, implies that two diVerent political
party majorities exist in the presidency and the congress. However, US congres-
sional rules have traditionally included the ability of 40 percent of senators to block
any decision by Wlibustering, which has almost always made the president’s party
unable to impose its decisions by its own. This could explain why no signiWcant
diVerences in legislative performances between periods of ‘‘uniWed’’ and ‘‘divided’’
governments have been observed (as persistently reported by King and Ragsdale
1988; Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1992; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Peterson and Greene
1993; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; but see
discussion in Howell, Adler, Caneron, and Riemann 2000; Conley 2003).
Assuming that, in order to prevent deadlock, a situation of divided government
(and, in the United States, almost any real situation) may lead to negotiations
between the president’s and other parties to form a suYcient congressional
majority to make laws, it has been postulated that the absence of a single-party
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parliamentary majority in a parliamentary regime should also be characterized as
‘‘divided government.’’ The integration into the same category of both the congres-
sional minority president in a regime of separation of powers and the typical multi-
party coalition or minority government in a parliamentary-proportional regime
would make the USA ‘‘not exceptional’’ (Laver and Shepsle 1991; Elgie 2001).
A related approach also integrating institutions and parties in the same count
centers on so-called ‘‘veto-players’’ (Tsebelis 1995, 2002). In this approach, political
regimes can be analyzed for how many veto-players exist, which may have sign-
iWcant consequences on the degree of complexity of policy decision making. In the
analysis of parliamentary systems, the number of veto-players turns out to be
equivalent to the number of parties in government, thus not taking into account
whether they are pivotal or superXuous to making the coalition a winning one (a
subject largely discussed, in contrast, in the literature on coalition formation, as
well as that on power indices, as revised by Felsenthal and Machover 1998; Leech
2002). In checks-and-balances and similar regimes, the number of veto-players
increases with the number of ‘‘chambers’’ (including the presidency) with diVerent
partisan control. A single veto-player situation would be equivalent to ‘‘uniWed
government’’ as deWned above, thus also making parliamentary and checks-and-
balances and related regimes equivalent when the decision-power is highly con-
centrated.
In contrast to other approaches, this may result in non-dual classiWcations, since
not only one or two, but several numbers of veto-players can exist in a political
system. However, this approach pretends to analyze how political institutions work
in practice, not the a priori characteristics of diVerent constitutional formulas,
which does make it less appealing for constitutional choice, advise, or design. The
exclusion of the electoral stage from the analysis tends even to blur the fundamen-
tal distinction between autocracy and democracy. From the perspective provided
by the veto-player approach, single-party governments would work in the same
way independently of whether they were autocratic or democratic (For methodo-
logical critiques, see Moser 1996; Ganghof 2005).
Taking into account the analyses of both the relations between the executive and
the legislative and the electoral rules previously reviewed, a more complex Wve-fold
typology of democratic constitutional regimes can be derived. The relatively high
number of a priori, polar types here considered does not presume that there are
always signiWcant diVerences in the working and proximate outcomes of all of
them, but it does not preclude potentially interesting empirical Wndings that more
simple or dualistic typologies may make impossible to observe. Empirical analyses
may reduce the number of relevant types when, for the purposes of the problem
under scrutiny, some of them may appear to be collapsed into a single one. But this
may be a result of the analysis rather than an a priori simplifying assumption. From
lower to higher degrees of concentration of power, the types of constitutional
regimes previously discussed are:
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1. parliamentary-proportional (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands);
2. checks and balances (e.g. United States, Indonesia);
3. semi-presidential (e.g. France, Poland);
4. presidentialist (e.g. Argentina, Mexico);
5. parliamentary-majority (e.g. United Kingdom, Canada).
Note that types 1 and 5 correspond to the classical category of ‘‘parliamentary’’
regime, here drastically split for diVerent party systems and electoral systems, while
types 2, 3, and 4 are variants of the classical category of ‘‘presidential’’ regime as
discussed in the previous section. Regarding the other typologies reviewed above,
the ‘‘consensus’’ model would correspond to type 1, while the ‘‘majoritarian’’ model
would include types 2, 3, 4, and 5; type 1 would usually be associated with ‘‘divided
government,’’ while types 2, 3, and 4 would alternate between ‘‘divided’’ and
‘‘uniWed’’ governments, and type 5 would usually be associated with ‘‘uniWed
government’’; there could be multiple veto-players in types 1, 2, 3, and 4, although
not always, while type 5 would tend to have a single veto-player with higher
frequency. Thus, the diVerent typologies here reviewed only agree on considering
types 1 and 5 as extreme, respectively implying diVuse and concentrated power,
while types 2, 3, and 4 are diVerently classiWed, either together with any of the two
extreme types or as intermediate ones.
4 Constitutional Consequences
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
It has been repeatedly postulated that diVerent constitutional formulas have
diVerent consequences on politics, policy, and the polity. The ‘‘proximate’’ political
consequences of diVerent constitutional arrangements regard mainly the type,
party composition, and degree of stability of governments. The rest of the conse-
quences should be considered relatively ‘‘remote,’’ indirect, and perhaps identiW-
able in terms of constraints, limits, and opportunities, rather than determining
speciWc decisions or outcomes. They may aVect economic and other public policy
making, as well as the corresponding performance, but only partially. Also, diVer-
ent constitutional formulas may help democracy to endure or facilitate its short-
ening. On all of these levels, signiWcant and interesting empirical correlations
between diVerent constitutional formulas and outcomes have been found. But
these correlations do not always go together with the speciWcation of the mechan-
isms by which they may exist; in particular, how diVerent types of governments
may be linked to diVerent policy performances, and how the latter may be related
to the duration of democratic regimes.
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4.1 Government Formation
In parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral rules, a single party, even with
minority electoral support, usually Wnds suYcient institutional levers to form a
government. This tends to make these governments more internally consistent and
more durable than multi-party coalition or minority governments typical of
parliamentary regimes with proportional representation, which are more vulner-
able to coalition splits, censure, or conWdence-lost motions, and other events and
strategies provoking anticipated elections (Grofman and Roozendaal 1997; Strom
and Swindle 2002; Smith 2004).
However, relatively stable single-party parliamentary governments, as well as
presidential governments with a president’s party majority in the assembly and
Wxed terms, tend to produce more changing and unstable policies than those relying
upon the support of multiple parties or inter-institutional agreements. To under-
stand this, consider that a single-party government is the institutional result of an
election that becomes decisive for all the multiple policy issues that may enter the
government’s agenda. As the ‘‘spatial theory’’ of voting can illuminate, the ‘‘single-
package’’ outcome of political competition in a policy ‘‘space’’ formed by multiple
issues and dimensions can be highly unpredictable. The election may be won on the
basis of a small set of issues that become prominent during the campaign and in
voters’ information driving their vote. But the subsequent single-party government
may have a free hand to approve and implement its preferred policies on many issues,
even if they have not been salient in the previous debate and campaign.
In contrast, in multi-party elections producing coalition cabinets, as well as in
inter-institutional relations involving diVerent political majorities, each party can
focus on a diVerent set of issues, globally enlarging the electoral agenda and the
corresponding debate. In the further institutional process, certain issues (typically
including major domains such as macroeconomic policy, interior, and foreign
aVairs) are dealt with separately on single-issue ‘‘spaces’’. Each of them can usually
be the subject of a broad multi-party or inter-institutional agreement around a
moderate position, which precludes drastic changes and induces policy stability in
the mid- or long term. Other issues can be negotiated in such a way that the
minority with more intense preferences on each issue may see its preferred policy
approved, whether through the distribution of cabinet portfolios to parties focused
on diVerent domains (such as Wnances for liberals, education for christian-
democrats, social policy or labor for social-democrats, etc.) or through logrolling
among diVerent groups on diVerent issues in congress. This second mechanism
creates diVerent but enduring political supports to the decisions on each issue and
also tends to produce relative policy stability. (Some ideas of this sort can be found
in Blondel and Mu¨ller-Rommel 1988, 1993; Budge and Keman 1990; Laver
and SchoWeld 1990; Strom 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1994, 1996; Deheza 1998; Mu¨ller
and Strom 2000).
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4.2 Policy Performance
A seminal analysis of the policy eVects of diVerent constitutional regimes and the
type of governments they produce emerged from the study of British politics (see
early discussion in Finer 1975). As seen from this observatory, a parliamentary-
majoritarian regime creating single-party governments on the basis of a minority
of popular votes is the scene of ‘‘adversary politics.’’ This implies two major
consequences: Wrst, electorally minority governments with a social bias are more
prone to be captured by minority interest groups and to implement redistributive
and protectionist policies hurting broad social interests; second, frequent alterna-
tion of socially and electorally minority parties in government produces policy
reversal and instability (including changes in regulations of prices, the labor
market, taxes), which depress investment incentives. The bases for sustained
economic growth seemed, thus, to be damaged by the likely eVects of Westmin-
ster-type constitutional rules on government-formation and policy-making.
This kind of argument has been tested in a number of studies basically using the
(Westminster)majoritarian/consensus dual typology reviewed in the previous sec-
tion. Most empirical Wndings show no signiWcant diVerences in the performance of
the two types of political regimes regarding economic growth, although some of
them indicate a slightly better record for consensus democracies on inXation and
unemployment. Better results for the consensus model have been found regarding
electoral participation, low levels of politically motivated violence, women’s
representation, and social and environmental policies (Powell 1982; Baylis 1989;
Lijphart 1984, 1999; Crepaz 1996; BirchWeld and Crepaz 1998; Eaton 2000).
Using a diVerent approach, it has also been held that parliamentary regimes with
proportional representation tend to develop broad programs beneWting a majority
of the voters, including redistribution through social security and welfare policies,
in contrast to narrower targets in both parliamentary regimes with majoritarian
elections and presidential regimes. The parliamentary-proportional regimes
appear to be associated to better growth-promoting policies, but they also have
relatively high taxes and public spending, which do not necessarily favor growth
(Persson and Tabellini 2003).
The weakness of empirical relations such as those here reported might reXect a
relative remoteness of the independent variable (constitutional models) from the
dependent one (economic and social performance). Economic growth, in particu-
lar, has indeed much more ‘‘proximate’’ causes than political institutions, such as
capital formation, labor productivity, entrepreneurship, trade, technology
availability, and education. The opposite of ‘‘proximate,’’ which would correspond
to the role of institutions, should be ‘‘remote,’’ since the ‘‘proximate’’ causes just
mentioned may in turn depend on institutions but also on other non-institutional
variables such as climate and natural resources, population, and human capacities.
Regarding institutions, those favoring state eVectiveness and an eVective judiciary,
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as well as those regulating property rights, contracts, and Wnances, might be more
relevant to explaining economic growth than certain variants in constitutional
formulas and not necessarily closely related to them. (For recent discussions, see
Hammond and Butler 2003; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Glaeser, La Porta, and
Lopez-de-Silanes 2004; Przeworski 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005).
A new way to research could be designed by analogy to some recent studies on
the relation between electoral systems and party systems reported above. In both
problems (the relation between electoral systems and party systems and the
relation between constitutional formulas and economic growth), the main trad-
ition in empirical studies is comparative statics, that is, the comparison of diVerent
supposedly independent variables established in diVerent countries. An alternative
approach would compare diVerent supposedly independent variables within the
same country. In a similar way as changes in party systems have been identiWed
before and after the change of electoral rules in each country, the rates of economic
growth or other interesting variables could be compared for periods with diVerent
constitutional formulas in each country (including democracy or dictatorship).
This may require diYcult collections of data for very long periods. But it
would permit a better identiWcation of the speciWc eVects of changing political-
institutional variables over the background of presumably more constant variables
for each country such as natural resources and population.
4.3 Democracy Duration
DiVerent constitutional formulas have also been linked to diVerent rates of success
of attempts at democratization and to the duration of democratic regimes. Recent
analyses of political change have emphasized that strategic choices of diVerent
constitutional formulas are driven by actors’ relative bargaining strength, electoral
expectations, and attitudes to risk (Przeworski 1986, 1991; Elster 1996; Elster, OVe,
and Preuss 1998; Colomer 1995, 2000; Geddes 1996; Goodin 1996; Voigt 1999).
A common assumption is that citizens and political leaders tend to support those
formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject those making
them permanently excluded and defeated. As a consequence, those constitutional
formulas producing widely-distributed satisfactory outcomes should be more able
to develop endogenous support and endure. In general, widely representative and
eVective political outcomes should feed social support for the corresponding
institutions, while exclusionary, biased, arbitrary, or ineVective outcomes might
foster citizens’ and leaders’ rejection of the institutions producing such results. In
this approach, support to democracy is not necessarily linked to good economic
performance, as discussed above, but to a broader notion of institutional satisfac-
tion of citizens’ political preferences. This is consistent with a rational notion of
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legitimacy (Rogowski 1974), it can modeled as a positive relation between institu-
tional pluralism and democratic stability (Miller 1983), and it can be reWned with
the concepts of behavioral and institutional equilibrium (Shepsle 1986; Colomer
2001b, 2205a; Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003).
Citizens’ political satisfaction with democratic outcomes has been estimated by
means of measures of congruence between citizens’ preferences and policy makers’
positions and through survey polls. From the Wrst approach, it has been found
that cabinets in parliamentary regimes with proportional representation include
the median voter’s preference with higher frequency than those using majoritarian
electoral rules, in both parliamentary and presidential regimes; proportional
representation and multi-parties, reduce, thus, the aggregate ‘‘distance’’ between
citizens and rulers (Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000). In consistency with
these Wndings, an analysis of survey polls in West European countries show
that political satisfaction with the way democracy works is more widely and
evenly distributed in pluralistic regimes than in majoritarian ones (Anderson
and Guillory 1997).
In general, constitutional democracies favoring power sharing and inclusiveness
should be able to obtain higher endogenous support and have greater longevity
than those favoring the concentration of power. Indeed, empirical accounts show
that democratic regimes are the most peaceful ones, while semi-democratic or
transitional regimes are most prone to conXict, even more than exclusionary
dictatorships (basically because the latter increase the costs of rebellion) (Snyder
1996; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). Among democracies, parlia-
mentary regimes are more resilient to crises and more able to endure than
presidential ones (Linz 1990b; Stepan and Skach 1993, Mainwaring 1993; Linz and
Valenzuela 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000; but see discus-
sion by Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Cheibub and Limogi 2002). But by using a
three-fold typology that, in consistency with the discussion above, also takes
electoral systems into account, parliamentary majoritarian regimes appear to be
associated with a higher frequency of ethnic and civil wars than presidential
regimes, while parliamentary proportional regimes are the most peaceful ones
(Reynal 2002, 2005). Proportional representation systems also experience fewer
transnacional terrorist incidents than majoritarian ones (Li 2005).
Actually, almost no new democracy established in the world during the broad
‘‘third wave’’ of democratization starting in 1974 has adopted the British-style
constitutional model of parliamentary regime with a two-party system and major-
itarian electoral rules. This may make comparisons based on the dual typology
parliamentary/presidential less reductive for this period since the former type has
become, in fact, largely identiWed with its variant with proportional representation
elections. But the three-fold typology can illuminate the pitfalls of the British
constitutional model in previous periods, when most new democracies having
adopted this model eventually fell and were replaced with dictatorships.
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The number of constitutional democracies rose enormously during the last
quarter of the twentieth century, encompassing for the Wrst time a majority of
total world population since 1996. This has been the result of a very long-term
evolution, which started in the so-called Wrst and second ‘‘waves’’ of democratiza-
tion (basically corresponding to the aftermaths of the First and the Second World
Wars), and accelerated in recent times with the end of the Cold War. Thus,
constitutionalism has been increasingly linked to democratization, as noted at
the beginning of this survey.
Among democratic constitutions, there has been a trend in favor of formulas
permitting relatively high levels of social inclusiveness, political pluralism, policy
stability, and democracy endurance. This reXects the relatively greater capability of
pluralistic formulas to generate endogenous support. Not only may citizens obtain
relatively broad satisfaction of their expectations and demands from democratic
institutional formulas requiring the formation of a broad majority to make
collective decisions, power-seeking politicians may also ultimately reject or aban-
don institutional formulas producing absolute losers and the total exclusion of
relevant actors from power. Of the democratic countries with more than one
million inhabitants, nowadays only less than one-sixth use parliamentary majority
constitutional formulas, while about one half are checks-and-balances regimes or
its presidentialist and semi-presidential variants, and more than one-third are
parliamentary proportional representation regimes (updated from Colomer
2001a).
5 Conclusion
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
A number of questions addressed in the previous pages have become key questions
in the political science literature on constitutions and may guide future research.
There is still some room for discussion over the conceptual and empirical adequacy
of the diVerent political regime typologies. A clear distinction should be made
between a priori institutional characteristics of the diVerent models and the actual
working of the samples of cases observed, which are always unavoidably limited
and can thus induce biased inferences. The important role of party systems and
electoral systems in shaping the relations between parliaments and governments is
nowadays generally accepted, in contrast to narrower legalistic approaches that
were typical of constitutional studies a few generations ago. But other questions
remain open to more accurate analysis in a comparative perspective. They include
the diVerences between the US-style ‘‘checks and balances’’ model favoring power
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sharing and the ‘‘presidentialist’’ model, diVused in Latin America and possibly
other parts of the world, favoring the concentration of power and some exclusive-
ness. Also, it is not clear whether the so-called ‘‘semi-presidential’’ model should be
conceived as an alternation between diVerent phases corresponding to alternative
constitutional models rather than as an intermediate type.
The scope of direct political consequences that have been attributed to diVerent
constitutional models also deserves to be revised. Fairly direct consequences may
include diVerent degrees of policy stability and instability, which seems to be
associated, perhaps counter-intuitively, to complex and simple constitutional
frameworks respectively. Regarding economic performance, it would probably be
wise to consider that constitutional formulas may have only an indirect role that
should be put in a broader framework of non-institutional variables. While the
comparative method has been mostly applied to the hypothetical consequences of
diVerent constitutional formulas used in diVerent countries, a temporal dimension
may enhance the analysis. Rates of economic growth or other relevant variables
could be compared not only for diVerent countries with diVerent regimes, but also
for periods with diVerent constitutional formulas in each country, including
democracy and dictatorship.
Finally, theoretical and comparative analyses should help to improve constitu-
tional choice, advise, and design. The present wide spread of democracy in the
world raises new demands for constitutional formulas able to produce eYcient
decision making and broad social satisfaction with the outcomes of government.
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